The Return: Shadow Souls Chapter 7

Elena woke to the sound of Damon impatiently rapping on the window of the Prius. She was fully clothed, clutching her diary to her. It was the day after Matt had left them. â€Å"Did you sleep all night like that?† Damon asked, looking her up and down as Elena rubbed her eyes. As usual, he was immaculately dressed: all in black, of course. Heat and humidity had no effect on him. â€Å"I've had my breakfast,† he said shortly, getting in the driver's seat. â€Å"And I brought you this.† This was a styrofoam cup of steaming coffee, which Elena clutched as gratefully as if it were Black Magic wine, and a brown paper bag that proved to contain donuts. Not exactly the most nutritious breakfast, but Elena craved the caffeine and sugar. â€Å"I need a rest stop,† Elena warned as Damon coolly seated himself behind the wheel and started the car. â€Å"To change my clothes and wash my face and things.† They headed directly west, which accorded with what Elena had found by looking at a map on the Internet last night. The small image on her mobile phone matched the Prius's navigation system readout. They had both shown that Sedona, Arizona, lay on an almost perfectly straight horizontal line from the small rural road where Damon had parked overnight in Arkansas. But soon Damon was turning south, taking a roundabout route of his own that might or might not confuse any pursuers. By the time they found a rest stop, Elena's bladder was about to burst. She spent an unashamed half hour in the women's room, doing her best to wash with paper towels and cold water, brushing her hair, and changing into new jeans and a fresh white top that laced up the front like a corset. After all, one of these days she just might have another out of body experience while napping and see Stefan again. What she didn't want to think about was that with Matt's departure, she was left alone with Damon, an untamed vampire, traveling through the middle of the United States toward a destination that was literally out of this world. When Elena finally emerged from the restroom, Damon was cold and expressionless – although she noticed that he took the time to look her over just the same. Oh, damn, Elena thought. I left my diary in the car. She was as certain that he'd read it as if she'd seen him doing it, and she was glad that there was nothing in it about leaving her body and finding Stefan. Although she believed Damon wanted to free Stefan, too – she wouldn't be in this car with him if she didn't – she also felt that it was better that he didn't know she had gotten there first. Damon enjoyed being in charge of things as much as she did. He also enjoyed Influencing each police officer who pulled him over for blasting the speed limit. But today he was short-tempered even by his own standards. Elena knew from firsthand experience that Damon could make himself remarkably good company when he chose, telling outrageous stories and jokes until the most prejudiced and taciturn of passengers would laugh in spite of themselves. But today he wouldn't even reply to Elena's questions, much less laugh at her own jokes. The one time she tried to make physical contact, touching his arm lightly, he jerked away as if her touch might ruin his black leather jacket. Fine, terrific, Elena thought, depressed. She leaned her head against the window and stared at the scenery, which all looked alike. Her mind wandered. Where was Matt now? Ahead of them or behind? Had he gotten any rest last night? Was he driving through Texas now? Was he eating properly? Elena blinked away tears, which welled up whenever she remembered the way he had walked away from her without a backward look. Elena was a manager. She could make almost any situation turn out okay, as long as the people around her were normal, sane beings. And managing boys was her speciality. She'd been handling them – steering them – since junior high. But now, approximately two and a half weeks since she had come back from death, from some spirit world that she didn't remember, she didn't want to steer anyone. That was what she loved about Stefan. Once she'd gotten past his reflexive instinct to keep away from anything he cherished, she didn't need to manage him at all. He was maintenance-free, except for the gentlest of hints that she'd turned herself into an expert on vampires. Not at hunting them or slaying them, but at loving them safely. Elena knew when it was right to bite or be bitten, and when to stop, and how to keep herself human. But apart from those gentle hints, she didn't even want to manage Stefan. She wanted simply to be with him. After that, everything took care of itself. Elena could live without Stefan – she thought. But just as being away from Meredith and Bonnie was like living without her two hands, living without Stefan would be like trying to live without her heart. He was her partner in the Great Dance; her equal and her opposite; her beloved and her lover in the purest sense imaginable. He was the other half of the Sacred Mysteries of Life to her. And after seeing him last night, even if it had been a dream, which she wasn't willing to accept, Elena missed him so much that it was a throbbing pain inside her. A pain so great that she couldn't bear to just sit and dwell on it. If she did she might just go insane and start raving at Damon to drive faster – and Elena might hurt inside, but she wasn't suicidal. They stopped at some nameless town for lunch. Elena had no appetite, but Damon spent the entire break as a bird, which for some reason infuriated her. By the time they were driving again, the tension in the car had built until the old clich was impossible to avoid: you could cut it with a folded napkin, much less a knife, Elena thought. That was when she realized exactly what kind of tension it was. The one thing that was saving Damon was his pride. He knew that Elena had things figured out. She'd stopped trying to touch him or even speak to him. And that was good. He wasn't supposed to be feeling like this. Vampires wanted girls for their pretty white throats, and Damon's sense of esthetics demanded that the rest of the donor be at least up to his standards. But now even Elena's human-sized aura was advertising the unique life-force in her blood. And Damon's response was involuntary. He had not even thought about a girl in this way for approximately five hundred years. Vampires weren't capable of it. But Damon was – very capable – now. And the closer he got to Elena, the stronger her aura was around him, and the weaker was his control. Thank all the little demons in hell, his pride was stronger than the desire he felt. Damon had never asked for anything from anyone in his life. He paid for the blood he took from humans in his own particular coin: of pleasure and fantasy and dreams. But Elena didn't need fantasy; didn't want dreams. Didn't want him. She wanted Stefan. And Damon's pride would never allow him to ask Elena for what he alone desired, and equally it would never allow him to take it without her consent†¦he hoped. Just a few days ago he had been an empty shell, his body a puppet of the kitsune twins, who had made him hurt Elena in ways that now made him cringe inside. Damon hadn't existed then as a personality, but his body had been Shinichi's to play with. And although he scarcely could believe it, the takeover had been so complete that his shell had obeyed Shinichi's every command: he had tormented Elena; he might well have killed her. There was no point in disbelieving it; or saying that it couldn't be true. It was true. It had happened. Shinichi was that much stronger when it came to mind control, and the kitsune had none of the vampires' detachment about pretty girls – below the neck. Besides which, he happened to be a sadist. He liked pain – other people's, that is. Damon couldn't deny the past, couldn't wonder why he hadn't â€Å"awakened† to stop Shinichi from hurting Elena. There had been nothing of him to awaken. And if a solitary part of his mind still wept because of the evil he had done – well, Damon was good at blocking it out. He wouldn't waste time over regrets, but he was intent on controlling the future. It would never happen again – not and leave him still alive. What Damon really couldn't understand was why Elena was pushing him. Acting as if she trusted him. Of all the people in the world, she was the one with the most right to hate him, to point an accusing finger at him. But she had never once done that. She had never even looked at him with anger in her dark blue, gold-spattered eyes. She alone had seemed to understand that someone as completely possessed by the master of the malach, Shinichi, as Damon had been, simply had no choice – wasn't there to make a choice – in what he or she did. Maybe it was because she'd pulled the thing the malach had created out of him. The pulsating, albino, second body that had been inside him. Damon forced himself to repress a shudder. He only knew this because Shinichi had jovially mentioned it, while taking away all Damon's memories of the time since the two of them, kitsune and vampire, had met in the Old Wood. Damon was glad to have had the memories gone. From the moment he had locked gazes with the fox spirit's laughing golden eyes, his life had been poisoned. And now†¦right now he was alone with Elena, in the middle of the wilderness, with towns few and far between. They were utterly, uniquely alone, with Damon helplessly wanting from Elena what every human boy she'd ever encountered had wanted. Worst of all was the fact that charming girls, deceiving girls, was practically Damon's own raison d'tre. It was certainly the only reason he'd been able to keep on living for the past half millennium. And yet he knew that he must not, must not even start the process with this one girl who, to him, was the jewel lying on the dungheap of humanity. To all appearances, he was perfectly in control, icy and precise, distant and disinterested. The truth was that he was going out of his mind. That night, after making sure that Elena had food and water and was safely locked into the Prius, Damon called down a damp fog and began to weave his darkest wards. These were announcements to any sisters or brothers of the night who might come upon the car that the girl inside it was under Damon's protection; and that Damon would hunt down and flay alive anyone who even disturbed the girl's rest†¦and then he'd get around to really punishing the culprit. Damon then flew a few miles south as a crow, found a dive with a pack of werewolves drinking in it and a few charming barmaids serving them, and brawled and bled the night away. But it wasn't enough to distract him – not nearly enough. In the morning, returning early, he saw the wards around the car in tatters. Before he could panic, he realized that Elena had broken them from the inside. There had been no warning to him because of her peaceful intent and innocent heart. And then Elena herself appeared, coming up the bank of a stream, looking clean and refreshed. Damon was stricken speechless by the very sight of her. By her grace, by her beauty, by the unbearable closeness of her. He could smell her freshly washed skin, and couldn't help deliberately breathing in more and more of her unique fragrance. He didn't see how he could put up with another day of this. And then Damon suddenly had an Idea. â€Å"Would you like to learn something that would help you to control that aura of yours?† he asked as she passed him, heading for the car. Elena threw him a sidelong glance. â€Å"So you've decided to talk to me again. Am I supposed to faint with joy?† â€Å"Well – that would always be appreciated – â€Å" â€Å"Would it?† she said sharply, and Damon realized that he had underestimated the storm he had brewed inside this formidable girl. â€Å"No. Now, I'm being serious,† he said, fixing his dark gaze on her. â€Å"I know. You're going to tell me to become a vampire to help control my Power.† â€Å"No, no, no. This has nothing to do with being a vampire.† Damon refused to be drawn into an argument and that must have impressed Elena, because finally she said, â€Å"What is it, then?† â€Å"It's learning how to circulate your Power. Blood circulates, yes? And Power can be circulated, too. Even humans have known that for centuries, whether they call it life-force or chi or ki. As it is, you're simply dissipating your Power into the air. That's an aura. But if you learn to circulate it, you can build it up for some really big release, and you can be more inconspicuous as well.† Elena was clearly fascinated. â€Å"Why didn't you tell me before?† Because I'm stupid, Damon thought. Because to vampires it's as instinctive as breathing is to you. He lied unblushingly. â€Å"It takes a certain level of competence to accomplish.† â€Å"And I can do it now?† â€Å"I think so.† Damon put slight uncertainty in his voice. Naturally, this made Elena even more determined. â€Å"Show me!† she said. â€Å"You mean right now?† He glanced around. â€Å"Someone might drive by – â€Å" â€Å"We're off the road. Oh, please, Damon? Please?† Elena looked at Damon with the huge blue eyes that altogether too many males had found irresistible. She touched his arm, trying once more to make some kind of contact, but when he automatically drew away, she continued, â€Å"I really do want to learn. You can teach me. Just show me once, and I'll practice.† Damon glanced down at his arm, felt his good sense and his will wavering. How does she do that? â€Å"All right.† He sighed. There were at least three or four billion people on this dust mote of a planet that would give anything to be with this warm and eager, yearning Elena Gilbert. The problem was that he happened to be one of them – and that she clearly didn't give a damn for him. Of course not. She had dear Stefan. Well, he would see if his princess was still the same when – if – she managed to free Stefan and get out of their destination alive. Meanwhile, Damon concentrated on keeping his voice, face, and aura all dispassionate. He'd had some practice at that. Only five centuries' worth, but it added up. â€Å"First I have to find the place,† he told her, hearing the lack of warmth in his voice, the tone that was not merely dispassionate but actually cold. Elena's expression didn't flicker. She could be dispassionate, too. Even her deep blue eyes seemed to have taken on a frosty glint. â€Å"All right. Where is it?† â€Å"Near where the heart is, but more to the left. He touched Elena's sternum, and then moved his fingers to the left. Elena fought back both tension and a shiver – he could see it. Damon was probing for the place where the flesh became soft over bone, the place most humans assumed their heart was because it was where they could feel their heart beating. It should be right around†¦here†¦. â€Å"Now, I'll run your Power through one or two circulations, and when you can do it by yourself – that's when you'll be ready to really conceal your aura.† â€Å"But how will I know?† â€Å"You'll know, believe me.† He didn't want her to ask questions, so he simply held up one hand in front of her – not touching her flesh or even her clothing – and brought her life-force in synchronization with his. There. Now, to set the process off. He knew what it would feel like to Elena: an electric shock, starting at the point where he had first touched her and quickly spreading warmth through her body. Then, a rapid montage of sensations as he went through a practice rotation or two with her. Up toward him, to her eyes and ears, where she would suddenly find she could see and hear much better, then down her spine and out to her fingertips, while her heartbeat quickened and she felt something like electricity in her palms. Back up her arm and down the side of her body, at which point a tremor would set in. Finally, the energy would sweep down her magnificent leg all the way to her feet, where she would feel it in her soles, curling her toes, before coming back around to where it had started near her heart. Damon heard Elena gasp faintly when the shock first hit her, and then felt her heartbeat race and her eyelashes flicker as the world suddenly became much lighter to her; her pupils dilating as if she were in love, her body going rigid at the tiny sound of some rodent in the grass – a sound she would never have heard without Power directed to her ears. And so, all around her body, once, and then again, so she could get a feel for the process. Then he let her go. Elena was panting and exhausted; and he'd been the one expending energy. â€Å"I'll never – be able – to do that alone,† she gasped. â€Å"Yes, you will, in time and with practice. And when you can do it, you'll be able to control all your Power.† â€Å"If you†¦say so.† Elena's eyes were shut now, her lashes dark crescents on her cheeks. It was clear that she'd been pushed to her limit. Damon felt the temptation to draw her to him, but suppressed it. Elena had made it clear that she didn't want him embracing her. I wonder just how many boys she didn't push away, Damon thought abruptly, bitterly. That surprised him a little, the bitterness. Why should he care how many boys had handled Elena? When he made her his Princess of Darkness, they would both go hunting for human prey – sometimes together, sometimes alone. He wouldn't be jealous of her then. Why should he care how many romantic encounters she'd had now? But he found that he was bitter, bitter and angry enough that he answered without warmth, â€Å"I do say you will. Just practice doing it alone.† In the car, Damon managed to stay annoyed with Elena. This was difficult, as she was a perfect traveling companion. She didn't chatter, didn't try to hum or – thank fortune – sing along with the radio, didn't chew gum or smoke, didn't backseat drive, didn't need too many rest stops, and never asked â€Å"Are we there yet?† As a matter of fact, it was difficult for anyone, male or female, to stay annoyed at Elena Gilbert for any length of time. You couldn't say she was too exuberant, like Bonnie, or too serene, like Meredith. Elena was just sweet enough to offset her bright, active, ever-scheming mind. She was just compassionate enough to make up for her self-confessed egotism, and just skewed enough to ensure that no one would ever call her normal. She was intensely loyal to her friends and just forgiving enough that she herself considered almost no one an enemy – kitsune and Old Ones of the vampire kind excepted. She was honest and frank and loving, and of course she had a dark streak in her that her friends simply called wild, but that Damon recognized for what it really was. It compensated for the naà ¯ve, soft, ingenuous side of her nature. Damon was very sure that he didn't need any of those qualities in her, especially right now. Oh, yes†¦and Elena Gilbert was just gorgeous enough to make any of her negative characteristics completely irrelevant. But Damon was determined to be annoyed and he was strong-willed enough that he could usually choose his mood and stick to it, appropriate or not. He ignored all of Elena's attempts at conversation, and eventually she gave up trying to make them. He kept his mind pinned to the dozens of boys and men whom the exquisite girl beside him must have bedded. He knew that Elena, Caroline, and Meredith had been the â€Å"senior† members of the quartet when they had all been friends, while little Bonnie had been the youngest and had been considered a bit too naà ¯ve to be fully initiated. So why was he with Elena now? he found himself asking sourly, wondering for just the slightest second if Shinichi was manipulating him as well as taking his memories. Did Stefan ever worry about her past – especially with an old boyfriend – Mutt – still hanging around, willing to give his very life for her? Stefan must not, or he'd have put a stop – no, how could Stefan put a stop to anything Elena wanted to do? Damon had seen the clash of their wills, even when Elena had been a child mentally just after returning from the afterlife. When it came to Stefan and Elena's relationship, Elena was definitely in control. As humans said: She wore the trousers in the family. Well, soon enough she could see how she liked wearing harem trousers, Damon thought, laughing silently, although his mood was darker than ever. The sky over the car darkened further in response, and wind ripped summer leaves from branches before their time. Cat's paws of rain dotted the windshield, and then came the flash of lightning and the echoing sound of thunder. Elena jumped slightly, involuntarily, every time the thunder let loose. Damon watched this with grim satisfaction. He knew she knew that he could control the weather. Neither of them said a single word about it. She won't beg, he thought, feeling that quick savage pride in her again and then feeling annoyance with himself for being so soft. They passed a motel, and Elena followed the blurry electric signs with her eyes, looking over her shoulder until it was lost in darkness. Damon didn't want to stop driving. Didn't dare stop, really. They were headed into a really nasty storm now, and occasionally the Prius hydroplaned, but Damon managed to keep it under control – barely. He enjoyed driving in these conditions. It was only when a sign proclaimed that the next place of shelter was over a hundred miles away that Damon, without consulting Elena, swung into a flooding driveway and stopped the car. The clouds had let loose by then; the rain was coming down in bucketfuls; and the room Damon got was a small outbuilding, separated from the main motel. The solitude suited Damon just fine.

Friedrich Von Hayek – Law, Legislation and Liberty

t of e ofj â€Å"cc L AW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY This is Hayek's major statement of political philosophy. Rejecting Marx, Freud, logical positivism and political egalitarianism, Hayek shows that the naive application of scientific methods to culture and education has been harmful and misleading, creating superstition and error rather than an age of reason and culture. Law, Legislation and Liberty combines all three volumes of Hayek's comprehensive study on the basic principles of the political order of a free society.Rules and Order deals with the basic conceptions necessary for a critical analysis of prevailing theories of justice and of conditions which a constitution securing personal liberty would have to satisfy. The Mirage of Social Justice presents a critical analysis of the theories of utilitarianism, legal positivism and ‘social justice'. The Political Order of a Free People demonstrates that the democratic ideal is in danger of miscarrying due to confusions of egali tarianism and democracy, erroneous assumptions that there can be moral standards without moral discipline, and that tradition can be ignored in proposals for restructuring society.F. A. Hayek became both a Doctor of Law and a Doctor of Political Science at the University of Vienna. He was made the first Director of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research and in 1931 was appointed to a chair at the London School of Economics. In 1950 he went to the University of Chicago as Professor of Social and Moral Sciences and then became Professor of Economics at the Albert-Ludwigs-Universitat of Frieburg and Professor Emeritus in 1967. He was also a Fellow of the British Academy and was awarded a Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1974. Hayek died in 1992. L AW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTYA new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy Volume 1 RULES AND ORDER Volume 2 THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE Volume 3 THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE F. A. Hayek Vol. 1 Rul es and Order first published 1973 Vol. 2 The Mirage of Social Justice first published 1976 Vol. 3 The Political Order of a Free People first published 1979 First published in one volume with corrections and revised preface in 1982 by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. Reprinted 1993, 1998 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE  © F. A. Hayek 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982 Printed and bound in Great Britain by T. l.International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 0-415-09868-8 C ONTENTS Volume 1 RULES AND ORDER xv CONSOLIDATED PREFACE INTRODUCTION 8 REASON AND EV OLUTION Construction and evolutionThe tenets of Cartesian rationalism The permanent limitations of our factual knowledge Factual knowledge and science The concurrent evolution of mind and society: the role of rules The false dichotomy of ‘natural' and ‘artificial' The rise of the evolutionary approach The persistence of constructivism in current thought Our anthropomorphic language Reason and abstraction Why the extreme forms of constructivist rationalism regularly lead to a revolt against reason 2 8 9 11 15 17 20 22 24 26 29 31 COSMOS AND TAXIS 35 The concept of order The two sources of order The distinguishing properties of spontaneous orders Spontaneous orders in natureIn society, reliance on spontaneous order both extends and limits our powers of control Spontaneous orders result from their elements obeying certain rules of conduct The spontaneous order of society is made up of individuals and organizations 35 36 38 39 v 41 43 46 C ONTENTS The rules of spon taneous o rders and the rules of organization The terms ‘organism' and ‘organization' 5 55 55 67 THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF LAW 72 Law is older than legislation The lessons of ethology and cultural anthropology The process 0. [ articulation of practices Factual and normative rules Early law The classical and the medieval traditionThe distinctive attributes of law arising from custom and precedent Why grown law requires correction by legislation The origin of legislative bodies Allegiance and sovereignty 4 PRINCIPLES AND EXPEDIENCY Individual aims and collective benefits Freedom can be preserved only by following principles and is destroyed by following expediency The ‘necessities' of policy are generally the consequences of earlier measures The danger ofattaching greater importance to the predictable rather than to the merely possibleconsequences ofour actions Spurious realisln and the required courage to consider utopia The role of the lawyer in political evolutionThe modern d evelopment of law has been guided largely by false economics 3 48 52 72 74 76 78 81 82 85 88 89 91 NOMOS: THE LAW OF LIBERTY 94 The functions of the judge How the task of the judge differs fro In that of the head of an organization The aiJn of jurisdiction is the Inaintenance of an ongoing order of actions ‘Actions towards others' and the protection ofexpectations 94 vi 56 59 61 62 65 97 98 101 C ONTENTS In a dynamic order of actions only some expectations can be protected The maximal coincidence of expectations is achieved by the deli/nitation of protected domains The general problem of the effects of values on factsThe ‘purpose' of law The articulations of the law and the predictability of judicial decisions Thefunction ofthejudge is confined to a spontaneous order Conclusions 6 THESIS: THE LAW OF LEGISLATION Legislation originates from the necessity of establishing rules of organization Law and statute-the enforcement of law and the execution of commands Legislation a nd the theory of the separation of powers The governmental functions of representative asselnblies Private law and public law Constitutional law Financial legislation Administrative law and the police power The ‘In easures , of policyThe transformation of private law into public law by ‘social'legislation The Inental bias ofa legislature preoccupied with governlnent 102 106 110 112 115 118 122 124 124 126 128 129 131 134 136 137 139 141 143 145 NOTES vii C ONTENTS Volume 2 THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 7 GENERAL WELFARE AND PARTICULAR PURPOSES In a free society the general good consists principally in the facilities for the pursuit of unknown purposes The general interest and collective goods Rules and ignorance The significance of abstract rules in a world in which most of the particulars are unknown Will and opinion, ends and values, commands and rules, nd other terminological issues Abstract rules operate as ultimate values because they serve unknown particular ends Th e constructivist fallacy of utilitarianism All valid criticism or improvement of rules of conduct must proceed within a given system of rules ‘Generalization' and the test of universalizabiiity To perform their functions rules must be applied throughout the long run 8 29 THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 31 Justice is an attribute of human conduct Justice and the law Rules of just conduct are generally prohibitions of unjust conduct Not only the rules ofjust conduct, but also the test of their justice, are negativeThe significance of the negative character of the test of injustice The ideology of legal positivism The ‘pure theory of law' 31 34 viii 1 6 8 11 12 15 17 24 27 35 38 42 44 48 C ONTENTS Law and morals The ‘law of nature' Law and sovereignty 9 56 61 ‘SOCIAL' OR DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 62 59 The concept of ‘social justice' The conquest of public imagination by ‘social justice' The inapplicability of the concept ofjustice to the results of a spontaneous p rocess The rationale of the economic game in which only the conduct of the players but not the result can be just The alleged necessity of a belief in the justice of rewardsThere is no ‘value to society' The meaning of ‘social' ‘Social justice' and equality ‘Equality of opportunity' ‘Social justice' and freedom under the law The spatial range of ‘social justice' Claims for compensation for distasteful jobs The resentment of the loss of accustomed positions Conclusions APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 9 62 65 67 70 73 75 78 80 84 85 88 91 93 96 JUSTICE AND 101 INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS lOT HEM ARK E TOR DE R 0 RCA TAL L A X Y The nature of the market order A free society is a pluralistic society without a common hierarchy of ends Though not asingle economy, the Great Society is still held ogether by what vulgarly are called economic relations The aim of policy in a society offree men cannot be a maximum offoreknown results but only an abstract order The game of catalla xy In judging the adaptations to changing circumstances comparisons of the new with the former position are irrelevant ix 107 107 109 112 114 115 120 C ONTENTS Rules of just conduct protect only material domains and not market values The correspondence of expectations is brought about by a disappointment of some expectations Abstract rules of conduct can determine only chances and not particular results Specific comlnands (‘interference') in a catallaxy create isorder and can never be just The aim of law should be to improve equally the chances of all The Good Society is one in which the chances of anyone selected at random are likely to be as great as possible 11 123 124 126 128 129 132 THE DISCIPLINE OF ABSTRACT RULES AND THE EMOTIONS OF THE TRIBAL SOCIETY 133 The pursuit of unattainable goals may prevent the achievement of the possible The causes of the revival of the organizational thinking of the tribe The immoral consequences of morally inspired efforts In the Great Soci ety ‘social justice' becomes a disruptive force From the care of the most unfortunate to the protection f vested interests Attempts to ‘correct' the order of the market lead to its destruction The revolt against the discipline of abstract rules The morals of the open and of the closed society The old conflict between loyalty and justice The small group in the Open Society The importance of voluntary associations 149 150 NOTES 153 x 133 134 135 137 139 142 143 144 147 C ONTENTS Volume 3 THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 12 MAJORITY OPINION AND CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY The progressive disillusionment about democracy Unlimited power the fatal effect of the prevailing form of democracy The true content of the democratic idealThe weakness of an elective assembly with unlimited 3 5 8 powe~ Coalitions of organized interests and the apparatus of para-government Agreement on general rules and on particular measures 13 13 17 THE DIVISION OF DEMOCRATIC POWERS 20 The loss of the or iginal conception of the functions of a legislature Existing representative institutions have been shaped by the needs of government, not of legislation Bodies with powers of specific direction are unsuitedfor law-making The character of existing ‘legislatures' determined by their governmental tasks Party legislation leads to the decay of democratic societyThe constructivistic superstition of sovereignty The requisite division of the powers of represen tative assemblies Democracy or demarchy? xi 20 22 25 27 31 33 35 38 C ONTENTS 14 THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR The double task of government Collective goods The delimitation of the public sector The independent sector Taxation and the size of the public sector Security Government monopoly of services Information and education Other critical issues 15 41 41 43 46 49 51 54 56 60 62 GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE MARKET 65 The advantages of competition do not depend on it being ‘perfect' Competition as a discovery proc edureIf the factual requirements of ‘perfect' competition are absent, it is not possible to makefirms act ‘as if' it existed The achievemen ts of the free market Competition and rationality Size, concentration and power The political aspects of economic power When monopoly becomes harmful The problem of anti-monopoly legislation Not individual, but group selfishness is the chief threat The consequences of a political determination of the incomes of the different groups Organizable and non-organizable interests 16 65 67 70 74 75 77 80 83 85 89 93 96 THE MISCARRIAGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL: A RECAPITUALATION The miscarriage of the democratic idealA ‘bargaining' democracy The playball of group interests Laws versus directions Laws and arbitrary government Froln unequal treatment to arbitrariness Separation of powers to prevent unlimited governlnent xii 98 98 99 99 100 101 102 104 C ONTENTS 17 105 The wrong turn taken by the development ofrepresentative institutions Th e value of a model of an ideal constitution The basic principles The two representative bodies with distinctive functions Further observations on representation by age groups The governmental assembly The constitutional court The general structure of authority Emergency powers The division offinancial powers 8 A MODEL CONSTITUTION 105 107 109 111 117 119 120 122 124 126 THE CONTAINMENT OF POWER AND THE DETH RONEM ENT OF POL ITICS 128 Lilnited and unlimited power Peace, freedom and justice: the three great negatives Centralization and decentralization The rule of the Inajority versus the rule of laws approved by the majority Moral confusion and the decay of language Democratic procedure and egalitarian objectives ‘State' and ‘society' A game according to rules can never know justice of treatment The para-government of organized interests and the hypertrophy of go vern men t Unlimited democracy and centralizationThe devolution of internal policy to local government The abo lition of the government monopoly of services The dethronement ofpolitics 128 130 132 133 135 137 139 141 143 145 146 147 149 EPILOGUE: THE THREE SOURCES OF HUMAN VALUES 153 The errors of sociobiology The process of cultural evolution The evolution of self-maintaining complex systems The stratification of rules of conduct 153 155 158 159 xiii C ONTENTS Customary rules and economic order The discipline offreedom The re-emergence of suppressed primordial instincts Evolution, tradition and progress The construction of new morals to serve old instincts: A1arxThe destruction ofindispensable values by scientific error: Freud The tables turned 161 163 165 168 169 173 175 177 NOTES I N DE X 0 F AUT H 0 R SCI TED I N VOL U M E S SUBJECT INDEX TO VOLUMES xiv 1-3 1- 3 209 217 C ONSOLIDATED PREFACE TO ONE-VOLUME EDITION At last this work can appear in the form it was intended to take when I started on it nearly twenty years ago. Half way through this period, when a first draft was nearly comple ted, a weakening of my powers, which fortunately proved to be temporary, made me doubt whether I should ever be able to complete it and led me to publish in 1973 a fully completed part of what were to become three eparate volumes. When a year later I found my powers returning I discovered that various circumstances made substantial revisions necessary of even those further parts of the draft which I had thought to be in fairly finished state. As I explained in the preface to the second volume, which appeared in 1976, the chief reason was my dissatisfaction with that central chapter which gave that volume its sub-title The Mirage of Social Justice. This account] had better repeat here: I had devoted to this subject an enormous chapter in which I had tried to show for a large number of instances that what as claimed as demanded by ‘social justice' could not be justice because the underlying consideration (one could hardly call it a principle) was not capable of general applicati on. The point I was then mainly anxious to demonstrate was that people would never be able to agree on what ‘social justice' required, and that any attempt to determine remunerations according to what it was thought was demanded by justice would make the market unworkable. I have now become convinced, however, that the people who habitually employ the phrase simply do not know themselves what they mean by t and just use it as an assertion that a claim is justified ‘without giving a reason for it. In my earlier efforts to criticize the concept I had all the time the feeling that I was hitting into a void and I finally attempted, what in such cases one ought to do in the first xv P REFACE instance, to construct as good a case in support of the ideal of ‘social justice' as was in my power. It was only then that I perceived that the Emperor had no clothes on, that is, that the term ‘social justice' was entirely empty and meaningless. As the boy in Hans Christian Andersen's story, I ‘could not see anything, because there was nothing to be seen. The more I tried to give it a definite meaning the more it fell apart-the intuitive feeling of indignation which we undeniably often experience in particular instances proved incapable of being justified by a general rule such as the conception of justice demands. But to demonstrate that a universally used expression which to many people embodies a quasi-religious belief has no content whatever and serves merely to insinuate that we ought to consent to a demand of some particular group is much more difficult than to show that a conception is wrong.In these circumstances I could not content myself to show that particular attempts to achieve ‘social justice' would not work, but had to explain that the phrase meant nothing at all, and that to employ it was either thoughtless or fraudulent. It is not pleasant to have to argue against a superstition which is held most strongly by men and women who are often regarded as the best in our society, and against a belief that has become almost the new religion of our time (and in which many of the ministers of old religion have found their refuge), and which has become the recognized mark of the good man.But the present universality of that belief proves no more the reality of its object than did the universal belief in witches or the philosopher's stone. Nor does the long history of the conception of distributive justice understood as an attribute of individual conduct (and now often treated as synonymous with ‘social justice') prove that it has any relevance to the positions arising from the market process. I believe indeed that the greatest service I can still render to my fellow men would be if it were in my power to make them ashamed of ever again using that hollow incantation.I felt it my duty at least to try and free them of that incubus which today makes fine sentiments the instruments for the destruction of all va lues of a free civilization-and to try this at the risk of gravely offending many the strength of whose moral feelings I respect. xvi P REFACE The present version of the central chapter of this volume has in consequence of this history in some respects a slightly different character from the rest of the volume which in all essentials was completed six or seven years earlier. There was, on the one hand, nothing I could positively demonstrate but y task was to put the burden of proof squarely on those who employ the term. On the other hand, in re-writing that chapter I no longer had that easy access to adequate library facilities which I had when I prepared the first draft of this volume. I have in consequence not been able in that chapter systematically to take account of the more recent literature on the topics I discussed as I had endeavoured to do in the rest of this volume. In one instance the feeling that I ought to justify my position vis-a-vis a major recent work has also cont ributed to delay the completion of this volume.But after careful consideration I have come to the conclusion that what I might have to say about John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1972) would not assist in the pursuit of my immediate object because the differences between us seemed more verbal than substantial. Though the first impression of readers may be different, Rawls' statement which I quote later in this volume (p. 100) seems to me to show that we agree on what is to me the essential point. Indeed, as I indicate in a note to that passage, it appears to me that Rawls has been widely misunderstood on this central issue.The preface to the third volume, which ultimately appeared in 1979, gives a similar account of the further development that also had better be repeated here: Except for what are now the last two chapters, most of it was in fairly finished form as long ago as the end of 1969 when indifferent health forced me to suspend the efforts to complete it. It was then, indeed , doubt whether I would ever succeed in doing so which made me decide to publish separately as volume 1 the first third of what had been intended to form a single volume, because it was in completely finished form. When I was able to return to ystematic work I discovered, as I have explained in the preface to volume 2, that at least one chapter of the original draft of that part required complete re-writing. Of the last third of the original draft only what was xvii P REFACE intended to be the last chapter (chapter 18) had not been completed at the time when I had discontinued work. But while I believe I have now more or less carried out the original intention, over the long period which has elapsed my ideas have developed further and I was reluctant to send out what inevitably must be my last systematic work without at east indicating in what direction my ideas have been moving. This has had the effect that not only what was meant to be the concluding chapter contains a good deal o f, I hope, improved re-statements of arguments I have developed earlier, but that I found it necessary to add an Epilogue which expresses more directly the general view of moral and political evolution which has guided me in the whole enterprise. I have also inserted as chapter 16 a brief recapitulation of the earlier argument. There were also other causes which have contributed to delay completion. As I had hesitated whether I ought to ublish volume 2 without taking full account of the important work of John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 1972), two new important books in the field have since appeared which, if I were younger, I should feel I must fully digest before completing my own survey of the same kind of problems: Robert Nozik, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York, 1974) and Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford, 1975). Rightly or wrongly I finally decided that if I made an effort fully to absorb their argument before concluding my own exposition, I would probably never do this. But I regard it as my duty to tell the younger readers that they cannot fully omprehend the present state of thought on these issues unless they make that effort which I must postpone until I have completed the statement of the conclusions at which I had arrived before I became acquainted with these works. The long period over which the present work has been growing also had the effect that I came to regard it as expedient to change my terminology on some points on which I should warn the reader. It was largely the growth of cybernetics and the related subjects of information and system theory which persuaded me that expression other than those which I habitually used may be more readily comprehensible o the contemporary reader. Though I still like and occasionally use the term ‘spontaneous order', I agree that xviii P REFACE ‘self-generating order' or ‘self-organizing structures' are sometimes more precise and unambiguous and therefore frequently us e them instead of the former term. Similarly, instead of ‘order', in conformity with today's predominant usage, I occasionally now use ‘system'. Also ‘information' is clearly often preferable to where I usually spoke of ‘knowledge', since the former clearly refers to the knowledge of particular facts rather than theoretical knowledge to which plain ‘knowledge' might be thought to refer.Finally, since ‘constructivist' appears to some people still to carry the commendatory connotation derived from the adjective ‘constructive', I felt it advisable, in order clearly to bring out the deprecatory sense in which I use that term (significantly of Russian origin) to employ instead the, I am afraid, still more ugly term ‘constructivistic'. I should perhaps add that I feel some regret that I have not had the courage consistently to employ certain other neologisms I had suggested, such as ‘cosmos', ‘taxis', ‘nomos', ‘thesis ', ‘catallaxy' and ‘demarchy'.But what the exposition has thereby lost in precision it will probably have gained in ready intelligibility. Perhaps I should also again remind the reader that the present work was never intended to give an exhaustive or comprehensive exposition of the basic principles on which a society of free man could be maintained, but was rather meant to fill the gaps which I discovered after I had made an attempt to restate, in The Constitution of Liberty, for the contemporary reader the traditional doctrines of classical liberalism in a form suited to contemporary problems and thinking.It is for this reason a much less complete, much more difficult and personal but, I hope, also more original work than the former. But it is definitely supplementary to and not a substitute for it. To the non-specialist reader I would therefore recommend reading The Constitution of Liberty before he proceeds to the more detailed discussion or particular examination of problems to which I have attempted solutions in these volumes. But they are intended to explain why I still regard what have now long been treated as antiquated beliefs as greatly superior to any alternative octrines which have recently found more favour with the public. The reader will probably gather that the whole work has xix P REFACE been inspired by a growing apprehension about the direction in which the political order of what used to be regarded as the most advanced countries is teuding. The growing conviction, for which the book gives the reasons, that this threatening development towards a totalitarian state is made inevitable by certain deeply entrenched defects of construction of the generally accepted type of ‘democratic' government has forced me to think through alternative arrangements.I would like to repeat here that, though I profoundly believe in the basic principles of democracy as the only effective method which we have yet discovered of making peaceful cha nge possible, and am therefore much alarmed by the evident growing disillusionment about it as a desirable Inelhod of government-much assisted by the increasing abuse of the word to indicate supposed ailns of governmentI am becoming more and more convinced that we are moving towards an impasse from which political leaders will offer to extricate us by desperate means. When the present volume leads up to a proposal of basic lteration of the structure of democratic government, which at this time most people will regard as wholly impractical, this is meant to provide a sort of intellectual stand-by equipment for the time, which may not be far away, when the breakdown of the existing institutions becomes unmistakable and when I hope it may show a way out. It should enable us to preserve what is truly valuable in democracy and at the same time free us of its objectionable features which most people still accept only because they regard them as inevitable. Together with the similar stand- by scheme I have proposed for depriving overnment of the monopolistic powers of control of the supply of money, equally necessary if we are to escape the nightmare of increasingly totalitarian powers, which I have recently outlined in another publication (Denationalisation of Money, 2nd edn, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1978), it proposes what is a possible escape from the fate which threatens us. I shall be content if I have persuaded some people that if the first experiment of freedom we have tried in modern times should prove a failure, it is not because freedom is an impracticable ideal, but because we have tried it the wrong way. xx P REFACEI trust the reader will forgive a certain lack of system and some unnecessary repetitions in an exposition which has been written and re-written over a period of fifteen years, broken by a long period of indifferent health. I am very much aware of this, but if I tried in my eightieth year to recast it all, I shall probably never co mplete the task. The Epilogue I added to that volume before publication indicates that even during the period of restricted activity my ideas have continued to develop imperceptibly more than I was aware before I attempted to sketch my present general view of the whole position in a public lecture.As I said in the concluding words of the present text, it became clear to me that what I said in that Epilogue should not be an Epilogue but a new beginning. I am glad to be able to say now that it has turned out to be such and that that Epilogue has become the outline of a new book of which I have now completed a first draft. There are a few acknowledgments that I ought to repeat here. Some ten years ago Professor Edwin McClellan of the University of Chicago had again, as on earlier occasions, taken great trouble to make my exposition more readable than I myself could have done.I am deeply grateful for his sympathetic efforts but should add, that since even in the early parts the draft on which he has worked has since undergone further change, he must not be held responsible for whatever defects the present version still has. I have however incurred further obligations to Professor Arthur Shenfield of London who has gone through the final text of the third volume and corrected there a variety of substantial as well as stylistic points, and to Mrs Charlotte Cubitt who, in preparing the final copy of that volume, has further polished the text.I am also much indebted to Mrs Cornelia Crawford of Irvington-on-Hudson, New York, who has again applied her proven skill and understanding in preparing the subject index giving references to all three still separately paginated volumes. xxi L AW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY Volume 1 RULES AND ORDER Intelligent beings may have laws of their own making; but they also have some which they never made. (Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des lois, I, p. i) I NTRODUCTIONThere seems to be only one solution to the problem: that the elite of mankind a cquire a consciousness of the limitation of the human mind, at once simple and profound enough, humble and sublime enough, so that Western civilisation will resign itself to its inevitable disadvantages. G. Ferrero* When Montesquieu and the framers of the American Constitution articulated the conception of a limiting constitution 1 that had grown up in England, they set a pattern which liberal constitutionalism has followed ever since.Their chief aim was to provide institutional safeguards of individual freedom; and the device in which they placed their faith was the separation of powers. In the form in which we know this division of power between the legislature, the judiciary, and the administration, it has not achieved what it was meant to achieve. Governments everywhere have obtained by constitutional means powers which those men had meant to deny them. The first attempt to secure individual liberty by constitutions has evidently failed. Constitutionalism means limited governmen t. But the interpretation given to the traditional formulae of constitutionalism has made it possible to reconcile these with a conception of democracy according to which this is a form of government where the will of the majority on any particular matter is unlimited. 3 As a result it has already been seriously suggested that constitutions are an antiquated survival which have no place in the modern conception of government. 4 And, indeed, what function is served by a constitution which makes omnipotent government possible?Is its function to be merely that governments work smoothly and efficiently, whatever their aims? In these circumstances it seems important to ask what those founders of liberal constitutionalism would do today if, pursuing I NTRODUCTION the aims they did, they could command all the experience we have gained in the meantime. There is much we ought to have learned from the history of the last two hundred years that those men with all their wisdom could not have kn own. To me their aims seem to be as valid as ever.But as their means have proved inadequate, new institutional invention is needed. In another book I have attempted to restate, and hope to have in some measure succeeded in clarifying, the traditional doctrine of liberal constitutionalism. 5 But it was only after I had completed that work that I came to see clearly why those ideals had failed to retain the support of the idealists to whom all the great political movements are due, and to understand what are the governing beliefs of our time which have proved irreconcilable with them.It seems to me now that the reasons for this development were chiefly: the loss of the belief in a justice independent of personal interest; a consequent use of legislation to authorize coercion, not merely to prevent unjust action but to achieve particular results for specific persons or groups; and the fusion in the same representative assemblies of the task of articulating the rules of just conduct wit h that of directing government.What led me to write another book on the same general theme as the earlier one was the recognition that the preservation of a society of free men depends on three fundamental insights which have never been adequately expounded and to which the three main parts of this book are devoted. The first of these is that a selfgenerating or spontaneous order and an organization are distinct, and that their distinctiveness is related to the two different kinds of rules or laws which prevail in them.The second is that what today is generally regarded as ‘social' or distributive justice has meaning only within the second of these kinds of order, the organization; but that it is meaningless in, and wholly incompatible with, that spontaneous order which Adam Smith called ‘the Great Society', and Sir Karl Popper called ‘the Open Society'.The third is that the predominant model of liberal democratic institutions, in which the san1e representative bod y lays down the rules of just conduct and directs government, necessarily leads to a gradual transformation of the spontaneous order of a free society into a totalitarian system conducted in the service of some coalition of organized interests. This development, as I hope to show, is not a necessary consequence of democracy, but an effect only of that particular form of unlimited government vvith which delllocracy has come to be identi2 I NTRODUCTION fied.If I aln right, it would indeed seem that the particular form of representative government which now prevails in the Western world, and vhich many feel they must defend because they nlistakenly regard it as the only possible form of democracy, has an inherent tendency to lead away from the ideals it was intended to serve. It can hardly be denied that, since this type of democracy has come to be accepted, we have been moving away from that ideal of individual liberty of which it had been regarded as the surest safeguard, and are now drifting towards a system â€Å",~hich nobody wanted.Signs are not wanting, however, that unlimited democracy is riding for a fall and that it will go down, not with a bang, but with a whimper. It is already becoming clear that many of the expectations that have been raised can be met only by taking the powers of decision out of the hands of democratic assemblies and entrusting them to the established coalitions of organized interests and their hired experts. Indeed, we are already told that the function of representative bodies has become to ‘mobilize consent', 6 that is, not to express but to manipulate the opinion of those whom they represent.Sooner or later the people will discover that not only are they at the mercy of new vested interests, but that the political machinery of para-government, which has grown up as a necessary consequence of the provision-state, is producing an impasse by preventing society from making those adaptations which in a changing world are requ ired to maintain an existing standard of living, let alone to achieve a rising one. It will probably be some time before people will admit that the institutions they have created have led them into such an impasse. But it is probably not too early to begin thinking about a way out.And the conviction that this will demand some drastic revision of beliefs now generally accepted is what makes me venture here on some institutional invention. If I had known when I published The Constitution of Liberty that I should proceed to the task attempted in the present work, I should have reserved that title for it. I then used the term ‘constitution' in the wide sense in which we use it also to describe the state of fitness of a person. It is only in the present book that I address myself to the question of what constitutional arrangements, in the legal sense, might be most conducive to the preservation of individual freedom.Except for a bare hint which fev readers will have noticed,7 I con fined myself in the earlier book to stating the principles which the existing types of government would have 3 I NTRODUCTION to follow if they wished to preserve freedom. Increasing awareness that the prevailing institutions make this impossible has led me to concentrate more and more on what at first seemed merely an attractive but impracticable idea, until the utopia lost its strangeness and came to appear to me as the only solution of the problem in which the founders of liberal constitutionalism failed.Yet to this problem of constitutional design I turn only in volume 3 of this work. To make a suggestion for a radical departure from established tradition at all plausible required a critical re-examination not only of current beliefs but of the real meaning of some fundamental conceptions to which we still pay lip-service. In fact, I soon discovered that to carry out what I had undertaken would require little less than doing for the twentieth century what Montesquieu had done for the eighteenth.The reader will believe me when I say that in the course of the work I more than once despaired of my ability to come even near the aim I had set myself. I am not speaking here of the fact that Montesquieu was also a great literary genius whom no mere scholar can hope to emulate. I refer rather to the purely intellectual difficulty which is a result of the circumstance that, while for Montesquieu the field which such an undertaking must cover had not yet split into numerous specialisms, it has since become impossible for any man to master even the most important relevant works.Yet, although the problem of an appropriate social order is today studied from the different angles of economics, jurisprudence, political science, sociology, and ethics, the problem is one which can be approached successfully only as a whole. This means that whoever undertakes such a task today cannot claim professional competence in all the fields with which he has to deal, or be acquainted w ith the specialized literature available on all the questions that arise.Nowhere is the baneful effect of the division into specialisms more evident than in the two oldest of these disciplines, economics and law. Those eighteenth-century thinkers to whom we owe the basic conceptions of liberal constitutionalism, David Hume and Adam Smith, no less than Montesquieu, were still concerned with what some of them called the ‘science of legislation', or with principles of policy in the widest sense of this term.One of the main themes of this book will be that the rules of just conduct which the lawyer studies serve a kind of order of the character of which the lawyer is largely ignorant; and that this order is studied chiefly by the economist who in turn is similarly ignorant of the character of 4 I NTRODUCTION the rules of conduct on which the order that he studies rests. The most serious effect of the splitting up among several specialisms of what was once a common field of inquiry , however, is that it has left a no-man's-land, a vague subject sometimes called ‘social philosophy'.Some of the chief disputes within those special disciplines turn, in fact, on differences about questions which are not peculiar to, and are therefore also not systematically examined by, anyone of them, and which are for this reason regarded as ‘philosophical'. This serves often as an excuse for taking tacitly a position which is supposed either not to require or not to be capable of rational justification. Yet these crucial issues on which not only factual interpretations but also political positions wholly depend, are questions which can and must be answered on the basis of fact and logic.They are ‘philosophical' only in the sense that certain widely but erroneously held beliefs are due to the influence of a philosophical tradition which postulates a false answer to questions capable of a definite scientific treatment. In the first chapter of this book I attempt to show that certain widely held scientific as well as political views are dependent on a particular conception of the formation of social institutions, which I shall call ‘constructivist rationalism' -a conception which assumes that all social institutions are, and ought to be, the product of deliberate design.This intellectual tradition can be shown to be false both in its factual and in its normative conclusions, because the existing institutions are not all the product of design, neither would it be possible to make the social order vvholly dependent on design without at the same time greatly restricting the utilization of available knowledge. That erroneous view is closely connected with the equally false conception of the human mind as an entity standing outside the cosmos of nature and society, rather than being itself the product of the same process of evolution to which the institutions of society are due.I have indeed been led to the conviction that not only some of the scientific but also the most important political (or ‘ideological') differences of our time rest ultimately on certain basic philosophical differences between two schools of thought, of which one can be shown to be mistaken. They are both commonly referred to as rationalism, but I shall have to distinguish between them as the evolutionary (or, as Sir Karl Popper calls it, ‘critical') rationalism on the one hand, and the erroneous constructivist (Popper's naIve') rationalism on the other. If the constructivist rationalism 5 I NTRODUCTION can be shovn to be based on factually false assumptions, a whole family of schools of scientific as well as political thought will also be proved erroneous. In the theoretical fields it is particularly legal positivisn1 and the connected belief in the necessity of an unlimited ‘sovereign' pover which stand or fall vith this error.The same is true of utilitarianism, at least in its particularistic or ‘act' variety; also, I am afraid that a not inconsiderable part of what is called ‘sociology' is a direct child of constructivisn1 when it presents its aims as ‘to create the future of mankind' 8 or, as one writer put it, claims ‘that socialism is the logical and inevitable outcome of sociology'. 9 All the totalitarian doctrines, of vhich socialism is merely the noblest and most influential, indeed belong here.They are false, not because of the values on vhich they are based, but because of a misconception of the forces vhich have Inade the Great Society and civilization possible. r-rhe demonstration that the differences between socialists and non-socialists ultimately rest on purely intellectual issues capable of a scientific resolution and not on different judgments of value appears to me one of the most important outcomes of the train of thought pursued in this book.It appears to me also that the same factual error has long appeared to make insoluble the most crucial problem of politi cal organization, namely ho† to limit the ‘popular will' vithout placing another ‘†rill' above it. As soon as ve recognize that the basic order of the Great Society cannot rest entirely on design, and can therefore also not aim at particular foreseeable results, we see that the requirement, as legitilnation of all authority, of a commitment to general principles approved by general opinion, Inay well place effective restrictions on the particular yill of all authority, including that of the Inajority of the rnoment.On these issues vhich vill be my main concern, thought seems to have made little advance since David Hume and Imlnanuel Kant, and in several respects it vill be at the point at which they left off that our analysis will have to resume. It was they who came nearer than anybody has done since to a clear recognition of the status of values as independent and guiding conditions of all rational construction.What I am ultimately concerned with here, alth ough I can deal only vith a small aspect of it, is that destruction of values by scientific error which has increasingly come to seem to me the great tragedy of our time-a tragedy, because the values which scientific error tends to dethrone are the indispensable foundation of all our 6 I NTRODUCTION civilization, including the very scientific efforts which have turned against them.The tendency of constructivism to represent those values which it cannot explain as determined by arbitrary human – decisions, or acts of will, or mere emotions, rather than as the necessary conditions of facts which are taken for granted by its expounders, has done much to shake the foundations of civilization, and of science itself, which also rests on a system of values which cannot be scientifically proved. 7 ONE REASON AND EVOLUTION To relate by whom, and in what connection, the true law of the formation of free states was recognized, and how this iscovery, closely akin to those which, under th e names of development, evolution, and continuity, have given a new and deeper method to other sciences, solved the ancient problem betveen stability and change, and determined the authority of tradition on the progress of thought. Lord Acton* Construction and evolution There are two ways of looking at the pattern of human activities which lead to very different conclusions concerning both its explanation and the possibilities of deliberately altering it. Of these, one is based on conceptions which are demonstrably false, yet are so pleasing to human anity that they have gained great influence and are constantly employed even by people who know that they rest on a fiction, but believe that fiction to be innocuous. The other, although few people will question its basic contentions if they are stated abstractly, leads in some respects to conclusions so unwelcome that few are willing to follow it through to the end. The first gives us a sense of unlimited power to realize our wishes, w hile the second leads to the insight that there are limitations to what we can deliberately bring about, and to the recognition that some of our present hopes are delusions.Yet the effect of allowing ourselves to be deluded by the first view has always been that n1an has actually limited the scope of what he can achieve. For it has always been the recognition of the limits of the possible which has enabled man to make full use of his powers. 1 The first view holds that human institutions will serve human purposes only if they have been deliberately designed for these purposes, often also that the fact that an institution exists is evidence of its having been created for a purpose, and always that we R EASON AND EVOLUTION should so re-design society and its institutions that all our actions will be wholly guided by known purposes. To most people these propositions seem almost self-evident and to constitute an attitude alone worthy of a thinking being. Yet the belief underlying them, that we owe all beneficial institutions to design, and that only such design has made or can make them useful for our purposes, is largely false.This view is rooted originally in a deeply ingrained propensity of primitive thought to interpret all regularity to be found in phenomena anthropomorphically, as the result of the design of a thinking mind. But just when man was well on the â€Å"vay to emancipating himself from this naive conception, it was revived by the support of a powerful philosophy with which the aim of freeing the human mind from false prejudices has become closely associated, and which became the dominant conception of the Age of Reason.The other view, which has slowly and gradually advanced since antiquity but for a time was almost entirely overwhelmed by the more glamorous constructivist view, was that that orderliness of society which greatly increased the effectiveness of individual action was not due solely to institutions and practices which had been invente d or designed for that purpose, but was largely due to a process described at first as ‘growth' and later as ‘evolution', a process in which practices which had first been adopted for other reasons, or even purely accidentally, were preserved because they enabled the group in which they had arisen to prevail over others. Since its first systematic development in the eighteenth century this view had to struggle not only against the anthropomorphism of primitive thinking but even more against the reinforcement these naive views had received from the new rationalist philosophy. It was indeed the challenge which this philosophy provided that led to the explicit formulation of the evolutionary view. 2 The tenets of Cartesian rationalism The great thinker from whom the basic ideas of what we shall call constructivist rationalism received their most complete expression was Rene Descartes.But while he refrained from drawing the conclusions from them for social and moral argument s, 3 these were mainly elaborated by his slightly older (but much more long-lived) contemporary, Thomas Hobbes. Although Descartes' immediate concern was to establish criteria for the truth of propositions, these 9 R EASON AND EVOLUTION were inevitably also applied by his follovers to judge the appropriateness and justification of actions. The ‘radical doubt' which made him refuse to accept anything as true which could not be logically derived from explicit premises that were ‘clear and distinct', and therefore beyond possible doubt, deprived of validity all those rules of conduct which could not be justified in this manner. Although Descartes himself could escape the consequences by scribing such rules of conduct to the design of an omniscient deity, for those among his followers to whom this no longer seemed an adequate explanation the acceptance of anything which was based merely on tradition and could not be fully justified on rational grounds appeared as an irration al superstition. The rejection as ‘mere opinion' of all that could not be demonstrated to be true by his criteria became the dominant characteristic of the movement which he started. Since for Descartes reason was defined as logical deduction from explicit premises, rational action also came to mean only such action as was determined entirely by known and demonstrable truth. It is almost an inevitable step from this to the conclusion that only what is true in this sense can lead to successful action, and that therefore everything to which man owes his achievements is a product of his reasoning thus conceived.Institutions and practices which have not been designed in this n1anner can be beneficial only by accident. Such became the characteristic attitude of Cartesian constructivism with its contempt for tradition, custom, and history in general. Man's reason alone should enable him to construct society anew. 4 This ‘rationalist' approach, however, meant in effect a relaps e into earlier, anthropomorphic modes of thinking. It produced a reneved propensity to ascribe the origin of all institutions of culture to invention or design. Morals, religion and law, language and writing, money and the market, were thought of as having been deliberately constructed by somebody, or at least as owing whatever perfection they possessed to such design.This intentionalist or pragmatic 5 account of history found its fullest expression in the conception of the formation of society by a social contract, first in Hobbes and then in Rousseau, who in many respects was a direct follover of Descartes. 6 Even though their theory was not alvvays meant as a historical account of what actually happened, it was always meant to provide a guideline for deciding whether or not existing institutions were to be approved as rational. 10 R EASON AND EVOLUTION I t is to this philosophical conception that we owe the preference which prevails to the present day for everything that is done ‘consciously' or ‘deliberately', and from it the terms ‘irrational' or ‘non-rational' derive the derogatory meaning they now have.Because of this the earlier presumption in favour of traditional or established institutions and usages became a presumption against them, and ‘opinion' came to be thought of as ‘mere' opinionsomething not demonstrable or decidable by reason and therefore not to be accepted as a valid ground for decision. Yet the basic assumption underlying the belief that man has achieved n1astery of his surroundings mainly through his capacity for logical deduction from explicit premises is factually false, and any attempt to confine his actions to what could thus be justified would deprive him of many of the most effective means to success that have been available to him. It is simply not true that our actions owe their effectiveness solely or chiefly to knowledge which we can state in vords and vhich can therefore constitute the exp licit premises of a syllogism.Many of the institutions of society which are indispensable conditions for the successful pursuit of our conscious aims are in fact the result of customs, habits or practices which have been neither invented nor are observed with any such purpose in view. We live in a society in which we can successfully orientate ourselves, and in which our actions have a good chance of achieving their aims, not only because our fellows are governed by known aims or known connections between means and ends, but because they are also confined by rules whose purpose or origin we often do not know and of whose very existence we are often not aware. Man is as much a rule-following animal as a purpose-seeking one. And he is successful not because he knows why he ought to observe the rules vhich he does observe, or is even capable of stating all these rules in vords, but because his thinking and acting are governed by rules which have by a process of selection been evolved i n the society in which he lives, and vhich are thus the product of the experience of generations. The permanent limitations of our factual knowledge The constructivist approach leads to false conclusions because man's actions are largely successful, not merely in the primitive stage but perhaps even more so in civilization, because they are adapted both II R EASON AND EVOLUTION to the particular facts which he knows and to a great many other facts he does not and cannot know. And this adaptation to the general circumstances that surround him is brought about by his observance of rules which he has not designed and often does not even knovv explicitly, although he is able to honour them in action.Or, to put this differently, our adaptation to our environment does not consist only, and perhaps not even chiefly, in an insight into the relations between cause and effect, but also in our actions being governed by rules adapted to the kind of world in which we live, that is, to circumstan ces which we are not aware of and which yet determine the pattern of our successful actions. Complete rationality of action in the Cartesian sense demands complete knowledge of all the relevant facts. A designer or engineer needs all the data and full power to control or manipulate them if he is to organize the material objects to produce the intended result. But the success of action in society depends on more particular facts than anyone can possibly know. And our whole civilization in consequence rests, and must rest, on our believing rnuch that we cannot know to be true in the Cartesian sense. What we must ask the reader to keep constantly in mind throughout this book, hen, is the fact of the necessary and irremediable ignorance on everyone's part of most of the particular facts which determine the actions of all the several members of human society. This may at first seem to be a fact so obvious and incontestable as hardly to deserve mention, and still less to require proof. Ye t the result of not constantly stressing it is that it is only too readily forgotten. This is so mainly because it is a very inconvenient fact which makes both our attempts to explain and our attempts to influence intelligently the processes of society very much more difficult, and which places severe limits on what we can say or do about them. There exists therefore a great temptation, as a first approximation, to begin with the assumption that we know everything needed for full explanation or control.This provisional assumption is often treated as something of little consequence which can later be dropped without much effect on the conclusions. Yet this necessary ignorance of most of the particulars which enter the order of a Great Society is the source of the central problem of all social order and the false assumption by which it is provisionally put aside is mostly never explicitly abandoned but merely conveniently forgotten. The argument then proceeds as if that ignorance did not matter. 12 R EASON AND EVOLUTION The fact of our irrcrnediable ignorance of most of the particular facts which determine the processes of society is, however, the reason why most social institutions have taken the form they actually have.To talk about a society about vvhich either the observer or any of its members knows all the particular facts is to talk about something wholly different from anything vhich has ever existcda society in which lnost of vhat ve find in our society vould not and could not exist and vhich, if it ever occurred, vould possess properties ve cannot even imagine. I have discussed the importance of our necessary ignorance of the concrete facts at some length in an earlier book 8 and will emphasize its central importance here mainly by stating it at the head of the vhole exposition. But there are several points vhich require re-statement or elaboration. In he first instance, the incurable ignorance of everyone which I am speaking is the ignorance of partic ular facts which are or will become knovn to somebody and thereby affect the vhole structure of society. rrhis structure of human activities constantly adapts itself, and functions through adapting itself, to millions of facts which in their entirety are not known to anybody. The significance of this process is most obvious and Tas at first stressed in the economic field. As it has been said, ‘the economic life of a non -socialist society consists of millions of relations or flows between individual firms and households. Ve can establish certain theorems about them, but vve can never observe all. 9 The insight into the significance of our institutional ignorance in the economic sphere, and into the methods by vhich ve have learnt to overcome this obstacle, vas in fact the starting point 10 for those ideas which in the present book arc systelnatically applied to a much wider field. It will be one of our chief contentions that most of the rules of conduct vhich govern our action s, and lnost of the institutions which arise out of this regularity, are adaptations to the impossibility of anyone taking conscious account of all the particular facts which enter into the order of society. vVe shall see, in particular, that the possibility of justice rests on this necessary limitation of our factual knowledge, and that insight into the nature of justice is therefore denied to all those constructivists  ·ho habitually argue on the assulnption of omniscience.Another consequence of this basic fact vhich must be stressed here is that only in the small groups of primitive society can collaboration betveen the members rest largely on the circumstance that at anyone moment they will know more or less the same particular 13 R EASON AND EVOLUTION circulnstances. SOl1le wise men 111ay be better at interpreting the immediately perceived circumstances or at remembering things in rClnote places unkndvvn to the others. But the concrete events vhich the individuals encounter i n their daily pursuits will be very much the same for all, and they will act together because the events they know and the objectives at which they aim are more or less the same.The situation is wholly different in the Great 11 or Open Society where millions of men interact and where civilization as we know it has developed. Econon1ics has long stressed the ‘division of labour' which such a situation involves. But it has laid much less stress on the fragmentation of knowledge, on the fact that each Inember of society can have only a small fraction of the knowledge possessed by all, and that each is therefore ignorant of most of the facts on which the working of society rests. Yet it is the utilization of much more knowledge than anyone can possess, and therefore the fact that each moves within a coherent structure most of whose deterlninants are unknown to him, that constitutes the distinctive feature of all advanced civilizations.In civilized society it is indeed not so much the greater knowledge that the individual can acquire, as the greater benefit he receives from the knovledge possessed by others, which is the cause of his ability to pursue an infinitely wider range of ends than merely the satisfaction of his most pressing physical needs. Indeed, a ‘civilized' individual may be very ignorant, more ignorant than many a savage, and yet greatly benefit from the civilization

What Do We Do with Howard

â€Å"What do we do with Howard? † Synopsis:Tad Pierson had recently been appointed as a project engineer. As project engineer for one of Agrigreen’s plants, he is responsible for the operation of the plant surveying group. For some time now Tad had been aware of some performance, safety, and conflicts with personnel within the group. These issues appear to be escalating in frequency and are causing Tad concern regarding the safety of the employees, the production schedules, and possible actions that he might need to take. Agrigreen, Inc. s a company that manufactures a verity of agricultural fertilizer. With plants located in the western United States and Canada, Agrigreen employs certified surveyors to ensure quality and safety of each project. Eighteen years ago, Agrigreen’s survey crew was composed of part-time drafting personnel or project engineers. Howard Lineberry, a lead surveyor had been employed with Agrigreen for eighteen years. Over his tenure he had been supervised by five different managers, and had three surveyor’s helpers. Howard’s work over the years has caused multiple safety and production issues.He has also had conflicts with the engineering staff, his managers, and almost everyone he worked with. Mel Cutler, a surveyor’s helper, after being employed by the company for only a few years was assigned to assist Howard. Five years into this assignment, Mel began to notice problems due to Howard’s note keeping method. These problems contributed to the production and safety issues with several projects. Later Mel began to notice that Howard was taking an excessive amount of snack breaks, coming to work late and leaving early.He also noticed Howard taking naps on the job. When the opportunity presented itself, Mel accepted a part-time assignment away from Howard. This reassignment resulted in a new surveyor’s helper being assigned, Vince Adam. Vince, an impressible young high school graduate, took on several of Howard’s inappropriate habits. Tad is concerned that the performance, safety, and personnel issues in the plant surveying group is getting out of control and is considering what action(s) that he should take, if any, at this point to intervene and correct the situations.Finding of Fact #1:One of the key issues of concern that Tad faces is the escalating quality of work being performed by Howard. Howard’s inefficient work processes in his note keeping and time management has caused issues in both production as well as safety violations on the job sites. These continual issues have cost Agrigreen in both extra man power to rebuild and delays in production. By examining Howard’s work process Tad can better understand what needs to be done and work toward eliminating these errors. Recommendation #1:Howard’s performance at work is a product of miss management and poor attitude.When Howard was first employed, his manager, Jerry Givens [now r etired], supervised with an iron hand. His management style can best be described as Theory X. Jerry took a command-and-control approach to management based on a negative view of Howard’s knowledge, skills, and ability. [ (Hellriegel & Slocum Jr. , 2008) ] He told Howard what to do and how to do it. Upon Jerry’s retirement, the next manager, Paul Jackson, used the Theory Y approach to management. He took on an empowering approach with Howard. This is where the problem truly began.Howard, with his new found freedom took it upon his self to improve the process by working directly with the project engineers. Howard’s efforts increased the pace of the work which called for a number of last minute requests and frequent changes in work schedules. By not having an establish plan of action in place, errors were made which cost the company time and money. Over the years, Howard’s performance issues escalated and upon several attempts by different managers, he refused to change. Tad has his work cut out for him.Regardless of how Howard may feel, Tad is still his boss and he is there to work for Agrigreen. Howard’s performance is not acceptable in any manner. While the failures of the previous managers to confront Howard about his performance problems have cost the company money it is now up to Tad to correct this issue. In doing so, there are a few things Tad should keep in mind. First, Tad should have a plan of action as to how he is going to confront this issue. With this plan of action, Tad should set define time as to the expected behaviors and outcomes expected in Howard’s performance.Next, Tad needs to meet with Howard and be specific in defining the poor performance that occurred in the past, and remind Howard when each error occurred. Tad also needs to be specific as to the plan of action and the established time frame to correct these errors as well as the consequences of non conformance. Tad needs to focus on the p erformance required for the job and make sure that he reiterates the guidelines that have been outlined for the workplace. Tad should consider Howard’s personality and how he handles feedback.Regardless of how Howard has been performing, Tad should always be clear and straightforward during his communication with Howard. He needs to focus on the performance which Howard has control. At the conclusion of this meeting, Tad should check Howard’s understanding to avoid any miss communications. After the meeting with Howard, Tad should document this meeting from his notes. He should document the issue and the action that has been taken to correct or eliminate the problems. After summarizing this meeting a copy of Tad’s report should be given to Howard and the original placed in Howard’s file.Finally, timely feedback should be given to Howard as Howard works on improving his performance. Should Tad note that Howard needs additional training, he should check wit h the human resource department for additional training classes, or set Howard with a mentor. Tad should realize that confronting Howard about his poor performance is not going to be easy. But once he has a plan of action in place, he will fine getting Howard back on track is far better for the company than having to replace him. [ (Busines & Legal Reports, 2006) ]The above action is how we handled an employee in our office who was a poor performer. I was set as her mentor, and working one-on-one with her I had to re-train her in our processes to ensure that she had a full understanding as to what was required in performing our job. After a brief three months, she is now producing high quality of work. As a reviewer, this young lady’s work is â€Å"spot on. † She is now off corrective action and is no longer in jeopardy of losing her job. Finding of Fact #2:The next issue Tad faces is Howard’s attendance.Over the years of Howards’ tenure, he had becom e complacent. He has been increasingly taking additional snack breaks, arriving to work late, leaving work early, as well as fall asleep on the job. For years, under the previous management, Howard’s actions have been over looked. Tad had witnessed several of these company violations, and has also noticed Vince; Howard’s assistant has been following the same pattern as Howard. Recommendation #2:Identifying attendance issues are not a simple process. There may be underlying issues which could be the driver of Howard’s absenteeism.Tad needs to first research the company’s policy and gain a full understanding of what he can and cannot do to resolve the issue. Tad also needs to consult with the human resource department as well as the legal department to understand and educate himself on the potential legal issues that also are involved. Once Tad had educated himself, he needs to approach Howard to determine if there are underline reasons for the continuing a ttendance issues. It depends on why the Howard is late, absent, or taking frequent breaks will drive the action that Tad needs to take.During Tad’s conversation with Howard, if it is determined that the reason for this attendance problem is caused by some type of stress issues, violence and or family problem Tad may need to refer Howard to the Employee Assistance program (EAP) for assistance. If the reason is medical, Tad may suggest Howard use the benefits allowed to him under the American’s with disability Act (ADA) or the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Should the outcome be something else, Tad may need to take a different approach. (Vikesland) ] A good approach is to counsel with Howard of the important of keeping time and punctuality while driving down the corporate policy and procedures. A â€Å"carrot-and-stick† approach is a time-tested method of dealing with attendance issues. Through this approach, Tad can use a combination of reward and punishmen t. As with the plan of action, Tad created for the production issue, he may wish to either add the attendance issue to the original plan, or write a separate plan of action. Also, Tad should use the same method of communication, documentation, and feedback with this issue as e does with the production issue. [ (Nayab, 2010) ] I work with a person who appears to have an attendance problem. This person comes in at various times during the day. I cannot a test to when she leaves as I’m already on my way home while she is still in the office. At times, I’ve noticed that she takes two sometimes two and a half hour smoke breaks. The issue here is we are exempted employees. Since this person sits next to me I talk with her a great deal, so I know her attendance problem is mostly stress related. I have told her about our EPA program, but she has opted not to take advantage of their services.Finding of Fact #3:The final issue may appear to be one of the hardest for Tad. This is the moral of the plant’s surveying group. For years, Howard’s continued errors and attendance has caused issues with the other employees. Mel Cutler was originally assigned to work with Howard as a surveyor’s helper. A few years ago Mel began working on other projects away from Howard. Now that the temporary assignment is reaching its conclusion, Mel had expressed his concerns with working with Howard. Tad appears to understand, since he has known the original surveyor’s helper Dan Richards and the same concerns were expressed than.There also appears to be concerns being expressed by the engineering crews. It appears that they do not trust the work that Howard produces, and takes additional time (which cost extra money) to verify Howard’s findings. As Howard’s new supervisor, Tad needs to get a clear view of the situation from different perspectives and act on them accordingly. Recommendation #3:The plant surveying group at Agrigreen works closely with the project engineers. For some time now, anxiety, frustration, and resentment has been building in reference to the growing problems with Howard.This appears to be the major cause of the low morale and high levels of employee dissatisfaction within the plant. If left unchecked this issue will only accelerate the problem and the company will lose key personal. When Tad was assigned the group, he knew that there was a continual conflict brewing. He needs to confront this issue head on. This can be accomplished by fostering interpersonal communication within the group. Tad needs to become an active listener by paying attention to the concerns of the group withhold holding judgment on those who chose to share their thoughts.He needs to develop open communication between this cross-functional team. He need to develop clear and specific goals for the team to work through their concerns. As Howard’s performance and attendance issues are protected by employment laws and regulations as well as corporate ethical policies, the solutions to those issues cannot be shared with the team. For this reason, the team must learn to work past these issues knowing that Tad is on top of those concerns. [ (Hellriegel & Slocum Jr. , 2008) ] Conflict at times can be a good thing.However this is not the case with the plant surveying group. Tad will have his work cut out. He not only has to resolve the conflict within his team, but he also need to understand his own personal issues with Howard. Tad needs to get his team together to work through these concerns. He needs to set the stage by working on an agreement within the team that the conflict is a mutual problem for all and that it can best be resolved through open communication rather than allowing the issues to fester. Next, Tad needs to get to the underlying issues and/or concerns of the team.He should ask each team member for their view points and respect their opinions and feelings. He also should express that he will need their cooperation in solving the problems. If the team cannot reach a common perception of the problem, than the team needs to try to see the problem from the other members view point. Sometimes brainstorming sessions are a great way of getting to the key factors of the conflict. This session if worked correctly, is a great tool at working through these conflicts and reaching a viable solution. (Conflict Resolution) ] As for Tad and his interpersonal conflict in reference to Howard, Tad needs to keep his concerns in check while on the job. Now that he is Howard’s boss, additional training may be needed to improve his interpersonal skills. This is what I believe my former manager should be doing. In working with her for the past two years, it has become apparent that she lacks interpersonal skills. Another lady I work with who trained the major of the staff when we first was awarded our contract has more than ten years of experience.When our former manager t alks with her, she comes across as demeaning and at time condescending. It is no wonder why she is no longer a manager. I personally feel that she needs to re-educate herself on how to deal with people.Works Cited Busines & Legal Reports, I. (2006, October 12). 8 Rules for Dealing with Poor Performers. Retrieved December 5, 2010, from HR. BLR. com: http://hr. blr. com/shitepapers/Performance-Termination/Performance-Employee-Appraisal/8-Rules-for-Dealing-with-Poor-Performers/ Conflict Resolution. (n. d. ). Retrieved December 5, 2010, from Mindtools. om: http://www. mindtools. com/pages/article/newLDR_81. htm Hellriegel, D. , & Slocum Jr. , J. W. (2008). MGMT 362: Organizational Behavior Columbia College. Mason, Ohio: Cengage Learning. Nayab, N. (2010, October 10). Strategies for Dealing with Employee Time & Attendance Problems. Retrieved November 5, 2010, from brighthub. com: http://www. brighthub. com/office/human-resources/articles/90380. aspx Vikesland, G. (n. d. ). Ho w to Deal with Employee Absenteeism. Retrieved December 5, 2010, from Employer-Employee. com: http://www. employer-employee. com/absent. html